The Court notes that antitrust litigation is complex, and the "chilling" effect that prolonged antitrust litigation has on competition and the economy. Because of the importance and weight of antitrust litigation, when faced with summary judgment, a party must bring more profound evidence to bear than what would normally be expected. The precise facts of this case are complex and convoluted because the reported decision was based on several reports by four special masters and numerous other judicial opinions. In a footnote to another related case, Judge Scheindlin noted that "[t]his case has been very burdensome to the judicial system." Procedural steps included the filing of thirty-nine motions, 2,300 evidentiary objections, and "five (5) significant opinions." See 28 F. Supp. 2d 833 at 838 & n.2. It should also be noted that the first opinion in this matter came was issued in 1996.

The parties to the case included Union Carbide, as plaintiff, but also included at least 17 defendants, in various international permutations of their corporate entity. Most of the controversy began when two of the Dutch corporations, including the Dutch permutation of Shell Oil Company, began to discuss a merger with Montedison, a Dutch manufacturer of polypropylene resins. As it turned out, Union Carbide had been in lengthy, ongoing discussions and cooperative ventures with the Dutch and English corporations. Shell Oil Company had been collaborating with Union Carbide in a number of ways, the last of which was called the "Nautilus negotiations." These broke down when Royal Dutch Shell and Shell Oil were seriously considering merger with the above-mentioned Montedison, a competitor. After the merger was complete, the companies were no longer interested in purchasing licensing agreements from Union Carbide.

Union Carbide brought a flurry of causes of action against the several defendants. Montell, the progeny of the merger between Royal Dutch Shell and Montedison (along with Shell Oil Company), and others made several motions for summary judgment contesting the validity of Union Carbide’s antitrust claims.

Union Carbide’s first claim asserted a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (ie. conspiracy). To satisfy the first prong of the test, there must be proof of concerted action between two or more legally distinct economic entities. The Court decided that there was sufficient proof to at least survive the motion for summary judgment, insofar as the existence of a conspiracy.

The second prong is that such an alleged conspiracy would have constituted an unreasonable restraint on trade. The Court, phrasing such a restraint as ancillary, reasoned that the conduct of the defendants (a conspiracy as alleged by Union Carbide) was in fact in furtherance of a legitimate goal. Such a goal was the agreement to cooperate. The agreement between the defendants had received conditional approval from the antitrust regulators, and Union Carbide tried to base their allegations on that, but did not cite any authority to support their point.

The Court analyzed the allegations made by Union Carbide under a rule of reason analysis, noting that even if such a cooperative agreement is ancillary, it still may violate the Sherman Act. The first step in the rule of reason analysis is to look at the alleged violator’s market power, most often determined by their market share. Union Carbide’s expert witness testified that Montell’s share was approximately 22.9%. Established caselaw, as noted by the Court, stands for the proposition that an organization that holding less than 30% of the market is incapable of exercising market power. Market power, however, may also be demonstrated "by evidence of ‘specific conduct indicating the defendant’s power to control prices or exclude competition.’" Id. Union Carbide, however, failed to show that the termination of the Nautilus negotiations and the formation of Montell caused any price increase. In other limited circumstances, the market power requirement may be substituted with actual adverse effect on competition test. The Court noted that this test is used as a safety valve where the plaintiff would be close to meeting the burden of the market power analysis. Union Carbide didn’t come close enough. Instead, the Court noted that Union Carbide’s "theory of competitive injury . . . is rather far fetched." Id.

Finally, the Court analyzed Union Carbide’s monopoly claim. Montell objected generally on the basis of the overly general nature of the complaint by Union Carbide. However, the Court held that there was a question of fact and that the jury must decide the issue.

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