
Plaintiffs
represented a class of all purchasers of health care services in an
eight-county area in central Wisconsin. Their allegations centered
around a conspiracy to divide the market, which, in turn, led to
supra-competitive prices. Defendant was a "physician-owned,
non-profit, multi-specialty clinic based in Marshfield, Wisconsin."
The defendant was tied to other health care organizations, ostensibly
for the purpose of making an integrated health care system throughout
that region of Wisconsin.
One
agreement was reached between North Central HMO and Marshfield, which is
labeled a free-flow agreement in certain counties. Marshfield and North
Central treated each other’s customers and agreed not to market in
certain areas. North Central eventually entered into an agreement with
two other companies, Rhinelander and Wausau, and marketed in other
counties as well. A handful of companies entered several other
complicated arrangements throughout the area. In addition, several years
previous to the instant case, Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of
Wisconsin and Compcare Health Services won a jury trial against
Marshfield. On appeal, only the market allocation verdict stood, but, on
remand, defendants prevailed "because the plaintiffs were unable to
demonstrate any injury tied specifically to the market allocation
verdict."
The Court
first determined that plaintiffs’ class had sufficient standing to
bring the suit, even over defendants’ objections. The defendants had
contended that plaintiffs had bought "resold" products, which
would ban plaintiffs’ standing, because for plaintiffs to allege an
antitrust injury, they must be direct purchasers. The Court held that
because plaintiffs had bought products from co-conspirators, the
direct-purchaser rule did not apply. Therefore, plaintiffs had standing.
Plaintiffs’
first substantive allegation was the conspiracy to allocate markets,
insofar as the relationship between Marshfield and the Rice Clinic, and
Marshfield and Wausau Medical Center. This was based on the fact that
Marshfield and Rice Clinic did not compete against each other. The Court
decided that this was not a violation, because there was no evidence
that this was either an express or implied agreement not to compete. Nor
did the market allocation allegation survive the Court’s scrutiny;
instead, there was evidence of an "affiliation," but not of an
agreement to restrict competition. As far as the agreement between
Marshfield and Wausau, the Court entered a discussion of
"ancillary" versus "naked" restraints on trade. An
ancillary restraint triggers rule of reason analysis whereas a naked
restraint is a per se violation of the antitrust laws. Although
plaintiffs contended that the agreements between Marshfield and Wausau
were per se, the Court declined to accept it as such, and stated that it
would be subject to rule of reason analysis. The free-flow agreement
between Marshfield and Wausau had enough evidence behind it to survive
summary judgment.
In terms
of causation, plaintiffs must sufficiently assert that they have an
injury "of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent." A necessary requisite of defendants being able to inflict
an antitrust injury on plaintiffs is that the defendants exercised
market power. After a discussion of cluster markets, where several
products are combined for sale to increase the value of the whole, and a
discussion of the geographic markets, the Court concluded that the
defendants exercised significant market power (greater than 50% within
the given geographic area) and that there was sufficient evidence such
that a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants did indeed
exercise market power.
As far as actual injury
to plaintiffs, the Court determined that the significant amount of
evidence was in conflict and that it seemed to show that the prices
charged by defendants were higher. "[The Court] cannot say that a
jury would be unreasonable to conclude . . . that plaintiffs paid more
for physician services because of defendants’ unlawful conduct."
Summary
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